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Torts-PRODucTS LIABILITY-CORPORATIONS-FLORIDA COURT
ADOPTS TRADITIONAL RULE OF SUCCESSOR LiAELITY-Bernard v.
Kee Manufacturing Co., 394 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
The doctrine of strict products liability is a fast developing area
of tort law' under which a manufacturer of a defective product
may be held strictly responsible for injury to the users of that
product." Greater sophistication in marketing techniques and man-
ufactured goods, coupled with the consumers' lack of expertise in
determining the fitness of goods, have led courts to embrace the
doctrine to provide consumers special protection in the
marketplace.$
Strict products liability has been widely adopted, resulting in
expanded manufacturer liability.' A recurring problem in this area,
however, stems from the nature of a products liability claim. The
plaintiff's claim may not arise for many years following the manu-
facture and sale of the defective product. During that time, control
of the manufacturer of the product may have been transferred to a
1. Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Mich. 1976).
2. The most widely accepted form of manufacturer liability is § 402 A(1) of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965):
§ 402 A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer. (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a)
the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is ex-
pected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
Section 402 A has been adopted in 26 jurisdictions. W. Knmnm & R. LaSHER, PRODUCTS
LuBiLrrY § 2 n.41 (1979). Under the strict products liability doctrine, a manufacturer or any
other person or entity in the chain of distribution of the product may be held liable for
injury to a person resulting from contact with the product if the product is shown to have
been defective and that the defect caused his injury or damage. Id. at § 21. In addition to
the manufacturer of the product, those in the chain of distribution may include the whole-
saler, the retailer, and component part manufacturers. Certifying agencies may also be lia-
ble. Id. at §§ 34-38.
3. The development of the doctrine of strict products liability is treated in depth in
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. Ray. 791 (1966); Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825 (1973).
For case law instrumental in the development of strict products liability, see Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods. Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d
436 (Cal. 1944); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
4. By 1971, two-thirds of the states had adopted the doctrine of strict products liability.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 98 (4th ed. 1971). The doctrine was adopted in Florida in 1976
in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976).
5. Comment, Products Liability: Developments in the Rule of Successor Liability for
Product-Related Injuries, 12 U. MICH. J.L. RE. 338, 339 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Devel-
opments in the Rule].
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successor corporation.
The method used to effectuate this transfer often determines
whether liability will be imposed on the successor.6 Under corpo-
rate law, if the transfer of control takes the form of a statutory
merger, consolidation, or a purchase of the stock of the predeces-
sor, the successor is automatically subject to suit for injuries
caused by products marketed by the predecessor.7 If, however, the
transfer was structured as a cash purchase of the predecessor's as-
sets by the successor,' the plaintiff may be denied recovery against
the successor, thereby impeding the special protection provided to
consumers by the strict liability doctrine. In such cases, the issue is
whether a company, having purchased for cash the assets of an-
other company and having continued its business, will be responsi-
ble for injuries caused by a defective product manufactured and
sold by its predecessor when the predecessor has ceased to exist.'
Although courts have broadened the class of defendants who
may be liable for product-related injuries, such parties are gener-
ally one of the links in the chain of distribution of the product
which caused the injury.l Because a successor corporation is not
technically within this chain, courts have been reluctant, until re-
cently, to expand liability to include successors.1" Injured plain-
6. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FREDMAN, PRODUCTS Lu~mLrry § 506[1] (1960 & Supp. 1981).
7. If a merger or consolidation is undertaken, liability is assumed by the surviving entity
pursuant to statute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.231 (1979); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT.
§§ 71, 72 (rev. ed. 1976) [hereinafter MBCA]. A merger occurs when one corporation absorbs
another, with the shareholders of the disappearing corporation receiving shares in the sur-
viving entity in exchange for their outstanding shares. MBCA § 71. A consolidation is ef-
fected when the component corporations dissolve and an entirely new corporation is spe-
cially organized to receive their assets. The shareholders of the dissolving corporations trade
their shares for shares in the new corporation. Id. § 72. When stock is acquired the original
seller of the defective product continues to exist and is subject to suit brought by an injured
party. See also Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The
Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction Claims,
41 Mo. L. REv. 321, 335 (1976).
8. A transfer of control achieved through asset purchase is simpler to accomplish than is
a statutory merger, consolidation, or a stock purchase because the procedural formalities are
avoided. A plan of merger must be incorporated into articles of merger approved by a ma-
jority of shareholders, which must be delivered to and approved by the Secretary of State.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 607.214, .221, .224 (1979).
With a sale of assets, only a majority of the shareholders of the selling corporation need
approve, and thus only dissenting shareholders of the selling corporation are provided statu-
tory appraisal rights. See FLA. STAT. §§ 607.241, .244, .247 (1979).
9. See Developments in the Rule, supra note 5, at 350. A sale of assets does not require
the dissolution of the transferor, which may continue to exist and be subject to liability for
product-related injury. See note 18 infra.
10. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at § 16A[4][b][vi-vii].
11. Id.
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tiffs, however, often look to successor corporations as their only
source of recovery. This note will first examine the principles of
corporate law underlying the reluctance to expand liability to suc-
cessors and will then focus on new rules which modify these corpo-
rate principles to reflect product liability policies.
The issue of successor products liability following a cash for as-
sets transaction was reached by a Florida court for the first time in
Bernard v. Kee Manufacturing Co."' In Bernard, the plaintiff re-
ceived injuries in 1976 while operating a lawnmower manufactured
and sold in 1967 by the defendant corporation's predecessor,
Flechas J. Kee d/b/a Kee Manufacturing, Inc. In 1972, individuals
having no prior interest in Kee's business formed Kee Manufactur-
ing Company, Inc. New Kee then purchased for cash the assets
and business of Mr. Kee, without contractually assuming any of
old Kee's liability. After the sale, Mr. Kee retired, retaining no in-
terest in the new company. 8
New Kee continued to manufacture lawnmowers at the plant
used by its predecessor, retaining some of Mr. Kee's non-manage-
ment staff. The brand name of Kee Mowers and the predecessor's
customer list continued to be used, the company's logo remained
much the same, and new Kee's sales brochures stated that it had
been manufacturing lawnmowers since 1948, thereby giving little
or no indication that a new company had taken over. New Kee also
continued to supply parts for mowers manufactured by old Kee,
although it discontinued the model of lawnmower that injured the
plaintiff.14
In the plaintiff's action against new Kee,'8 the trial court granted
the defendant corporation a final summary judgment. On appeal,
the Second District Court of Appeal held that new Kee's tort lia-
bility would be determined by established principles of corporate
law regarding a successor's liability for the debts of its
predecessor. 6
Under these principles, a bona fide purchaser of corporate assets
12. 394 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Successor liability in this context was
raised in Kinsler v. Rohm Tool Corp., 386 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). The
court in Kinsler, however, found it unnecessary to reach the issue of successor liability be-
cause the predecessor corporation was still a viable on-going entity, amenable to personal
service and financially responsible. Id. at 1281.
13. 394 So. 2d at 553.
14. Id.
15. In addition to the suit against new Kee, the plaintiff in Bernard maintained a sepa-
rate suit against Mr. Kee and the retailer which had sold the lawnmower.
16. 394 So. 2d at 555.
19811
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for adequate consideration is not liable, by operation of law, for
debts of the transferor unless such debts are contractually as-
sumed.17 Because the selling company need not be dissolved fol-
lowing a sale of its assets, it survives the transfer and remains pri-
marily responsible for liabilities not expressly assumed by the
purchaser in the sale agreement.1" This nonassumption rule was
developed for creditor-debtor relationships, and it has produced
acceptable results in that area. Creditor claims are determinable at
the time of sale and can be considered in setting a sale price. Con-
sequently, the proceeds of the sale should be available to satisfy
creditor judgments against the transferor. Because creditors will
generally be protected, liability for the predecessor's debts is not
imposed on the successor in a sale.19
This rule of nonassumption, however, has not protected credi-
tors in all instances. As a result, the scope of the rule has been
limited by four judicially-created exceptions.20 Notwithstanding
the nonassumption rule, a purchaser of assets for cash may be held
responsible for the liabilities of its predecessor where (1) the pur-
chaser expressly or impliedly agrees to pay the debts of the seller;21
(2) the transaction is a de facto merger or consolidation;"2 (3) the
17. See 15 W. FLrTCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORAxIONs § 7122 n.1
(rev. perm. ed. 1973) for a collection of cases invoking this traditional rule of corporate law.
Recent cases which have applied the general rule include Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565
F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); R.J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp., 555 F.2d 277 (10th Cir.
1977); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Hernandez v. Johnson
Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), aff'd, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) (not
followed in Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976)); Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co. v Canron, Inc., 402 N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y. 1977).
18. Although dissolution of the selling corporation need not necessarily occur following a
sale of assets, in fact the seller will often voluntarily dissolve soon after the sale is com-
pleted. See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Knapp v. North
Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon
v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358
F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo.
1968); Ray v. Alad Corp., 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (Cal. 1977); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp.,
388 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich.
1976).
19. Note, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A Break From Tradition, 49 U.
COLO. L. REV. 357, 359-60 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Products Liability for Successor
Corporations].
20. 15 W. FLxrcHEE, supra note 17, at § 7122.
21. See, e.g., Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc. 423 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1970); Bippus v. Norton
Co., 437 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
22. See, e.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
Originally, the de facto merger exception was developed for the protection of minority
shareholders. See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958) (where a purchase
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purchaser is essentially a continuation of the seller;23 or (4) the sale
is a fraudulent attempt to escape liability for the predecessor's
debts.2 4 Each of these exceptions is applicable to a successor corpo-
ration's products liability when the nonassumption rule has been
invoked to determine such liability.
The first and fourth exceptions are of little value to persons in-
jured by the predecessor's product after the sale of assets to the
successor.25 Findings of implied assumption and fraud can only be
made where liabilities are known to the parties at the time of the
transfer, with the result that there can be no implied assumption
or fraud where the product-related injury follows the sale."6
Consequently, when liabilities are not known at the time of the
transfer, the de facto merger and continuation of the business
exceptions provide products liability plaintiffs their only means of
recovery where the nonassumption rule has been invoked.27
Neither of these theories turns on whether the contingent tort lia-
bility was assumed or foreseeable at the time of sale.'8 Instead, the
applicability of either will generally depend on whether the prede-
cessor has been absorbed into the successor and whether con-
tinuity of ownership is present.9 In a sale of assets in exchange for
the stock of the successor, courts have found a de facto merger
where the successor continues the predecessor's business operation,
and where the dissolution of the predecessor and the distribution
of the successor's stock to the predecessor's shareholders occur
promptly after the sale. 0 De facto merger has not been found,
of assets was held to be a de facto merger).
23. See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
24. See, e.g., City of Altoona v. Richardson Gas & Oil Co., 106 P. 1025 (Kan. 1910).
25. The rationales underlying the first and fourth exceptions are clear. At base, neither
can be considered an exception at all. Under the first exception, where the successor has
expressly agreed to pay the debts of the predecessor, the successor will be bound by its
agreement, negating the effect of the nonassumption rule. Products Liability for Successor
Corporations, supra note 19, at 360. The fourth exception is most commonly applied to set
aside as fraudulent transfers based on inadequate consideration. See, e.g., Wolff v. Shreve-
port Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 70 So. 789 (La. 1916).
26. Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1305, 1311-13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Expanding Products Liability].
27. See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D.
Mich. 1974).
28. Expanding Products Liability, supra note 26, at 1311-13.
29. See, e.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F.Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
30. Id. at 801. In Shannon the defendant successor corporation exchanged shares of its
own stock for the assets of its predecessor, which dissolved following distribution of the
stock to its shareholders. The plaintiff was allowed to recover in its products liability suit
1981]
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however, where cash, rather than stock, was the consideration for
the sale because no continuity of ownership follows a cash sale. 1
Nor has a de facto merger been found where the predecessor cor-
poration did not dissolve until more than a year after the transfer
so that it could not be found to have been absorbed into the
successor.
82
In its basic form, the mere continuation exception will apply to
changes in the corporate entity, such as a recapitalization, a change
in name, or a change in the state of incorporation. The exception
has also been applied in cases where there is continuity of business
operation, management, directors, officers, and shareholders be-
tween the predecessor and the successor, and where the predeces-
sor dissolves following the transfer of assets. In those cases involv-
ing two corporate entities, application of the mere continuation
exception will do nothing more than duplicate the de facto merger
exception."
Applying the traditional corporate rule of nonassumption of lia-
bilities and its four exceptions, the district court in Bernard found
no tort liability on the part of new Kee. Under these established
principles of corporate law, new Kee was not liable to the products
liability plaintiff because (1) new Kee had not expressly or im-
pliedly assumed any of Mr. Kee's debts or obligations; (2) no statu-
tory consolidation or merger had occurred, and the transaction
could not be characterized as a de facto merger because Mr. Kee
did not receive stock in consideration for the sale; (3) the requi-
sites of continuity were absent because the sale resulted in a com-
plete change in the ownership and management of the corporation;
and (4) there was no suggestion of any attempt to escape liability
for the predecessor's debts. s' In effect, the injured plaintiff was de-
nied recovery against new Kee because the cash for assets transac-
against the successor, with the court invoking the general rule of nonassumption but finding
the de facto merger exception applicable where (1) there is a continuation of the enterprise
of the predecessor; (2) there is a continuity of shareholders interest; (3) the predecessor
ceases its ordinary operations and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible; and
(4) the successor corporation assumes those liabilities of the seller that are ordinarily neces-
sary for the continued operation of the business.
31. See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968). In Klober-
danz, the court also held that while there was continuity of business operations, no de facto
merger could be found where the transferor and transferee continued to exist following the
transfer of assets. Id. at 822.
32. See, e.g., McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970),
aff'd, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
33. 264 A.2d at 105-06.
34. 394 So. 2d at 555.
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tion between new Kee and its predecessor did not fall within any
of the relatively narrow exceptions to the nonassumption rule.
The court's decision in Bernard represents an exercise in judicial
restraint. In recent years, some courts have broadened the tradi-
tional exceptions to the nonassumption rule to allow recovery for
product-related injuries against successor corporations. 5 These
courts, recognizing that the nonassumption rule evolved in the cor-
porate context to protect successors from unassumed liability, have
found the rule inappropriate for the products liability setting.
These courts believe that the nonassumption rule undermines the
products liability policy of placing the burden of loss on the party
most able to bear the loss (the corporation) by spreading the risk.3 6
The court in Bernard, however, strictly applied the nonassumption
rule and its narrow exceptions, declining to expand successor lia-
bility beyond its traditional scope.87 The fact that a defective prod-
uct was involved did not lead the court to rethink or expand upon
the previously recognized exceptions in its application of corporate
concepts to the plaintiff's products liability suit. Any expansion of
successor liability, the court held, should be the responsibility of
the legislature."
In this respect, the court recognized the impact that judicial ac-
tivism might have. Corporate policy demands established rules of
liability which can be relied on in planning and accomplishing cor-
porate acquisitions. The nonassumption rule protects successors
that have purchased assets in reliance on the applicability of the
rule of liability assumption. It also safeguards the ability of
purchasing corporations to estimate correctly the costs of acquiring
assets and to plan the terms of sale.39 The ability of parties in fu-
ture corporate sales to estimate accurately the costs of acquiring
assets and to set the terms of sale would have been hampered if
the Bernard court had chosen to expand successor liability." More
35. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Ray v. lad Corp., 136 Cal.
Rptr. 574 (Cal. 1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976); Rami-
rez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 408 A.2d 818 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), certification
granted, 412 A.2d 804 (N.J. 1980).
36. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at § 5.06[3].
37. 394 So. 2d at 555. See also Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977);
Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778 (IlI. App. Ct. 1979); McKee v. Harris-
Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), affd, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1972); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Canron, Inc., 402 N.Y.S.2d 565
(N.Y. 1977)
38. 394 So. 2d at 555.
39. Developments in the Rule, supra note 5, at 356.
40. See Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L.
1981]
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importantly, such an expansion would exacerbate the problems of
the increasing costs of product liability litigation and the unavail-
ability of insurance, especially for small successor corporations.41
These problems in turn could result in the demise of many small
corporations and have a chilling effect on the commercial transfer
of assets.42
The Bernard decision is commendable to the extent that the
court recognized the business community's need for predictability
in commercial transactions and the undesirable ramifications of a
judicial change in the rules of successor liability. The critical weak-
ness in the decision, however, is the court's almost singular focus
on corporate principles in determining successor liability for prod-
uct-related injuries.
The nonassumption rule and its four exceptions were developed
not in response to products liability problems, but in the areas of
creditor protection, tax assessments, and shareholder rights.43 Al-
though these rules adequately protect the interests of the parties
for which they were designed,4 cases such as Bernard demonstrate
that the traditional corporate principles do not adequately protect
the interests of the products liability plaintiff.45
REV 86, 105 (1975).
41. Developments in the Rule, supra note 5, at 394. For an indepth study of the insur-
ance aspects of successor liability, see Products Liability and Successor Corporations: Pro-
tecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased Availability of
Products Liability Insurance, 13 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 1000, 1024-33 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Protecting the Product User]. The author argues that reform of insurance law to readily
provide insurance to successor corporations must follow any expansion of successor liability.
Id. at 1024. Citing Products Liability Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capi-
tal, Investment and Business Opportunities, of the House Comm. on Small Business, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., (Part 1) (1977), the author reports that products liability insurance was
unavailable to 21.6% of the businesses seeking to obtain such insurance and that the aver-
age increase in premiums from 1970 to mid-1977 was 944.6%. Protecting the Product User,
supra, at 1024-25 nn. 91-93, Legislative reform of insurance laws to impose mandatory in-
surance pooling requirements to compel insurers to underwrite certain risks is recommended
to deal with these insurance problems. Another suggested approach is the legislative encour-
agement of captive insurers. Id. at 1030-31 and accompanying notes.
42. Products Liability-Corporations-Asset Sales and Successor Liability, 44 TENN. L.
REV. 905, 916 (1977).
43. Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 877-78 (Mich. 1976).
44. Products Liability for Successor Corporations, supra note 19, at 360-61.
45. Several courts had indicated that the traditional corporate rules concerning the as-
sumption of liability are incapable of protecting consumers to the degree that the policies
underlying strict product liability require. See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506
F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d
1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379
F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975) (not followed in Ray v. Alad Corp., 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (Cal. 1977)).
CASE NOTES
Successor liability for product-related injuries is not simply a
question of corporate law, for these corporate principles must be
balanced against the principles underlying strict products liability.
As one commentator has noted, any rule developed for determining
successor liability must be one which accommodates both con-
sumer and business interests. 46 Consumers suffering product-re-
lated injuries must be provided a means of recovery. At the same
time, the law must continue to recognize the need of the business
community to control the effects of commercial transactions and
anticipate future costs. Application of the nonassumption rule and
its narrow exceptions to products liability cases like Bernard pre-
vents the necessary accommodation of these interests.
Judicial attempts to achieve this balance in other jurisdictions
have taken two forms. To provide the required protection to con-
sumers, some courts, working within the framework of the nonas-
sumption rule, have altered the traditional scope of the de facto
merger and mere continuation exceptions. In Knapp v. North
American Rockwell Corp."7 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Pennsylvania law, found a de facto merger and allowed
the plaintiff to recover even though the transferor continued to ex-
ist for eighteen months after an asset for stock sale, having assets
to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. Looking to the substance of the
transfer," the court noted that "questions of an injured party's
right to seek recovery are to be resolved by an analysis of public
policy considerations rather than by a mere procustean application
of formalities."' 49 Although an essential element of de facto
merger-the prompt dissolution of the transferor-was missing,
the court concluded that formalities should not deny the plaintiff's
claim5" and that social policies supported by Pennsylvania courts
permitted a finding of de facto merger." The result in Knapp is a
disregard of the separateness of the transferor and transferee, a
long-standing distinction between an asset sale and a merger.2
The decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Cyr v. B.
46. Developments in the Rule, supra note 5, at 369.
47. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974). In Knapp the plaintiff was injured by a defective paper
cutter made by TMW, whose assets were purchased by Rockwell in exchange for Rockwell
stock. Following the sale, TMW continued to exist for eighteen months, although the sale
agreement provided for its dissolution.
48. Id. at 368, 369.
49. Id. at 369.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 370.
52. Developments in the Rule, supra note 5, at 364.
1981]
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Offen & Co.,5" expanding the mere continuation exception to a
cash sale of assets, is significant for its balance of corporate and
tort principles. The court held that "where tort liability is con-
cerned, we should look to factors relevant to the specific claim and
not be bound by the factors that control where other debts and
liabilities are concerned. ' ' " Looking to the policies holding original
manufacturers liable for product-related injuries, the court found
them to apply equally to a successor that manufactured the same
line of equipment as its predecessor.5 Further, finding continuity
of the business to be the essence of the sale agreement, the court in
Cyr held the successor liable to the plaintiff for an injury caused
by a product manufactured by its predecessor." In so holding, the
Cyr decision modified the mere continuation exception by dis-
counting the element of continuity of ownership.5
Such decisions bring consumer interests more into balance. The
balance on the business side is disrupted, however, because contin-
ued use of the nonassumption rule with sporadic alteration of its
existing exceptions as determined by the facts of each case makes
the imposition of liability unpredictable.5 8 Such a process would no
more achieve a balance of consumer and business interests than
did the strict application of the nonassumption rule and its excep-
tions in Bernard. New rules which are responsive to the problems
of products liability plaintiffs and which provide a comprehensive
and unified approach to successor liability are essential and must
be considered.
53. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law). In Cyr the plaintiff was
injured by a drying oven on a printing press, which had been manufactured prior to a sale of
the predecessor. The successor corporation was owned by employees of the predecessor, who
assumed the prior obligations and purchased the good will and contract obligations of the
predecessor. The corporation's name remained much the same, and no notice was given to
the public that new ownership had taken over the corporation. The facts, consequently, are
similar to those in Bernard. Id.
54. Id. at 1153.
55. Id. at 1154. The court noted four policy justifications for imposing liability on the
original manufacturer:
(1) [T]he manufacturer is better able to protect itself and bear the costs while the
consumer is helpless; (2) it is the manufacturer which has launched the product
into the channels of trade; (3) it is the manufacturer which has violated the repre-
sentation of safety implicit in putting the product into the stream of commerce;
and (4) the manufacturer is the instrumentality to look to for improvement of the
product's quality.
Id.
56. Id.
57. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at § 5.06[3).
58. Developments in the Rule, supra note 5, at 369.
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Other courts have moved beyond the traditional framework of
the nonassumption rule and its four exceptions by creating special
rules for determining successor liability. The Michigan" and Cali-
fornia6" Supreme Courts have created other exceptions to the
nonassumption rule; the Michigan court establishing an "enter-
prise continuity" rule and the California court developing a "prod-
ucts line" theory. Both exceptions are applicable only to products
liability issues.
In °Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.61 the Michigan court
adopted a products liability approach to successor liability." Es-
tablishing its enterprise continuity rule, the court focused on the
de facto merger exception, inquiring whether there is a legally suf-
ficient difference between an acquisition made through the transfer
of some of the successor's stock and a cash purchase, justifying
products liability recovery following the former, but not the latter
transaction. 3 Dispensing with the traditional requirement of de
facto merger-payment with stock of the purchasing corpora-
tion-the court observed that, for the injured plaintiff, the prob-
lem of recovery is the same whether the acquisition was a statutory
merger, a de facto merger, or a cash purchase. Further, regardless
of the form of the transaction, the predecessor and successor cor-
porations have the same need for an accurate assessment of the
risk of future liabilities in computing an appropriate sale price."
Consequently, although the commonality of ownership between the
predecessor and successor resulting from stock for assets transac-
tions provides a sufficient nexus to establish successor liability, the
Michigan court held that the lack of commonality following a cash
transaction should not be conclusive in precluding successor liabil-
ity.' 5 Accordingly, the court held that continuity of the enterprise
rather than commonality of ownership should be the prime consid-
59. Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
60. Ray v. Alad Corp., 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (Cal. 1977). See also Ramirez v. Amsted In-
dus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981). In Ramirez, decided as this note was going to print, the
New Jersey Supreme Court adopted California's "product line" approach.
61. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). In Turner, the plaintiff was injured by a defective
power press manufactured by "Old Sheridan." Five years before the plaintiff's injury, Old
Sheridan's goodwill, name, assets, and property were sold to New Sheridan, a subsidiary of
Harris-Intertype Corp. formed to accept the assets of New Sheridan. Following the sale, Old
Sheridan dissolved. Id. at 875-76.
62. Id. at 877.
63. Id. at 879.
64. Id. at 878.
65. Id. at 880.
1981]
536 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:525
eration in determining successor liability."
In the products liability context, the court noted that enterprise
continuity is influenced by two factors: first, the extent to which
the successor has assumed the ability of the predecessor to calcu-
late the risks of defects and to insure against such risks; and sec-
ond, the extent to which the successor profits from the goodwill of
the predecessor through its outward representation of continuity.67
From this framework, the Turner court, rather than attempt to fit
its decision within either the de facto merger or mere continuation
exceptions, set forth a special test for determining successor liabil-
ity for product-related injuries. Under the Turner test, a prima fa-
cie case of enterprise continuity sufficient to impose successor lia-
bility can be made on a showing of (1) continuity of the outward
appearance of the enterprise, its management, personnel, physical
plant, assets, and general business operations; (2) the prompt dis-
solution of the predecessor following the transfer of assets; and (3)
an assumption of those liabilities and obligations necessary to the
uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations."
By relying on continuity of enterprise concepts and rejecting the
commonality of ownership requirements of de facto merger, the
Turner court sought to develop a rule that would lead to "common
result[s]" in successor liability actions regardless of the form of the
acquisition." Although the court's decision focused on product lia-
bility concepts, its enterprise continuity rule is expressed in corpo-
rate law language. 70 Consequently, the physical characteristics of
66. Id. at 882. The court in Turner held that "[c]ontinuity is the purpose, continuity is
the watch word, continuity is the fact." Id. Further, the court noted that "[i]t is this con-
tinuity that makes business sense. It is the consideration for the whole deal." Id. at 883.
Finally, the court injected an estoppel argument into these continuity concepts:
Where the successor corporation represents itself either affirmatively or, by
omitting to do otherwise, as in effect a continuation of the original manufacturing
enterprise, a strong indication of continuity is established. Justice would be of-
fended if a corporation which holds itself out as a particular company for the
purpose of sales, would not be estopped from denying that it is that company for
the purpose of determining products liability.
Id. at 882.
67. Id. at 881 (following Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974)).
68. The court in Turner did not list these elements in its decision, instead referring to
the first, third, and fourth elements of the Shannon test for determining de facto merger.
Id. at 883. These elements are set out in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797,
801 (W.D. Mich. 1974). The second element of the Shannon test, not used by the Turner
court in establishing its test of successor liability, concerned continuity of shareholders re-
sulting from a stock for assets transaction. Id. at 801.
69. 244 N.W.2d at 880.
70. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRmmAN, supra note 6, at § 5.06[3].
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the business (i.e., the continuity of the business' outward appear-
ance) remain critical, as they do in those decisions working within
the framework of the nonassumption rule and its exceptions.7 1
Products liability is imposed on manufacturers because they are
in a position to anticipate risks, guard against harm, absorb the
costs of injury, and distribute such costs among the public as a cost
of doing business. 2 The physical characteristics of the business are
irrelevant under these products liability policies. It is the product,
not the corporate structure, that is important, because it is gener-
ally the product that is in the public eye rather than the
manufacturer. 3
The enterprise continuity rule fails to invoke the products liabil-
ity concepts on which the Turner court relied, producing conse-
quences that may be at odds with the policies supporting the
court's adoption of the rule. The products liability plaintiff may
still be unable to recover against the successor corporation if all
the elements of enterprise continuity are not present.74
Further, where an asset purchase has been made and the ele-
ments of continuity are present, the Turner rule would make the
successor liable for all subsequent product-related injuries. Liabil-
ity would attach even where the product which caused the injury
was discontinued before or at the time of the transfer of control.
Such a result is inconsistent with the principles underlying both
the Turner decision and the strict products liability doctrine. If
the successor has not produced the product, it has not benefitted
from any goodwill generated by the product. Thus, an important
element in continuity is missing. While the successor may be in a
better position than the injured plaintiff to absorb the costs of
product-related injuries, the successor that discontinues the type
of product that caused the injury will never have received a benefit
against which the cost of the injury can be offset.75
The only rule for successor liability in products liability cases to
successfully accommodate business and consumer interests is the
one set forth by the California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad
Corp.76 In Ray the California court was faced with a case that did
71. Developments in the Rule, supra note 5, at 374.
72. W. KiMBLE & R. LEsHER, supra note 2, at § 2.
73. Developments in the Rule, supra note 5, at 374-75.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (Cal. 1977). In Ray, Alad I sold for cash its assets, trade name,
and goodwill to Alad II, a subsidiary of another corporation formed for the purpose of suc-
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not fit into any of the four traditional exceptions to the nonas-
sumption rule. The court specifically rejected any general modifi-
cation of the traditional exceptions to avoid broader liability than
intended for successors." Instead, it created a new exception to the
rule that is based on the policies that underlie the strict products
liability doctrine. The court noted that the purpose of the doctrine
"is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products
on the market rather than by the injured persons who are power-
less to protect themselves. 78 The doctrine holds that consumers
should not bear the risk of injury because such risks can be insured
by the manufacturer, with the costs distributed to the public.7 9
Based on this reasoning, and the observation that the traditional
exceptions to the nonassumption rule were not created to deal with
the problems of products liability plaintiffs, the court held it was
fair and equitable to extend strict liability to a successor where (1)
the plaintiff would have no viable remedy against the predeces-
sor;80 (2) the successor, at the time of sale, was able to measure the
risks of injury from products manufactured by the predecessor;81
and (3) the successor benefits from the goodwill associated with
the predecessor so that responsibility for defective products can
fairly attach to the successor.8a
ceeding Alad I. Following the sale, Ald I dissolved. The plaintiff was injured subsequent to
the sale, having fallen from a ladder produced by the predecessor. The only provisions for
assumption of liability by the successor were that Alad II pay for materials ordered by Alad
I prior to sale and to fill Alad I's uncompleted orders. Id. at 576-77.
77. Id. at 579.
78. Id. (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (Cal.
1963)).
79. 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal.
1944) (concurring opinion)).
80. 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580. In Ray, the injury occurred after the dissolution of the prede-
cessor. The court noted that even if the plaintiff were to obtain a judgment against the
dissolved and assetless predecessor, he would have great difficulty in receiving satisfaction
for the judgment against the predecessor's former directors or stockholders. Id. Further, the
court observed that the products liability insurance of a company that is no longer in busi-
ness would not likely be a source of compensation for injury caused by a product manufac-
tured by the predecessor. Id. at 581. Because the injured plaintiff's claim is one which is
generally not capable of being known at the time of sale, there is a greater likelihood of a
complete denial of redress for product-related injuries. Id.
81. The court noted that the successor used the predecessor's physical plant, manufac-
turing equipment, manufacturing designs, and the consulting services of the predecessor's
general manager. Consequently, the successor had the same capacity as its predecessor "to
estimate the risks of claims for injuries from defects in previously manufactured ladders for
purposes of obtaining insurance." Id.
82. The court held that extending liability to successors in the position of Alad II causes
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The California rule as announced in Ray holds a successor cor-
poration primarily responsible for injuries caused by defects in
units of a particular product line manufactured and distributed by
the predecessor where the successor continues to produce the prod-
uct that caused injury.8 Unlike the Turner rule, the "product line"
rule" in Ray is consistent with the policies underlying strict prod-
ucts liability. If the product which caused the injury is discontin-
ued and not produced by the successor, no benefit will have been
derived from the product by the successor, and under the Califor-
nia rule no liability on the part of the successor will attach. The
product line aspect of the California rule recognizes the business
interest in controlling the effects of commercial transactions and
anticipating costs. If the successor continues the product line of
the predecessor, liability will attach with no problems of inconsis-
tent application or interpretation of the four exceptions to the
nonassumption rule or the broader liability of the enterprise con-
tinuity rule of Turner.
In creating the product line exception, the Ray court provided
protection for the class of products liability plaintiffs affected by
corporate transfers. At the same time, the court avoided broad
changes in existing rules which remain appropriate for the corpo-
rate context.8 5 The end result of Ray is the needed accommodation
the one who takes the benefit to know the risk. The benefit includes acquisition of the
predecessor's trade name, good will, customer lists, continuation of the product line, and
holding out as the same enterprise. Such imposition is fair and equitable as to the successor,
and it precludes a windfall to the predecessor who may have received an enhanced price
from the successor reflecting the absence of successor liability or who may have avoided
liability by dissolving. Id. at 581-82.
83. Id. at 582. Applications of the Ray rule to the facts of Bernard might still leave the
injured plaintiff unprotected because of new Kee's discontinuance of the lawnmower that
had injured the plaintiff. In Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124 (Ct. App.
1979), however, the court noted that manufacturing by its very nature involves modification
of a product line or elimination of an unprofitable product. Therefore, the continuance of a
specific product line cannot be controlling.
For a discussion of methods which might be used to avoid a transfer of liability following
the Ray decision, see Protecting the Product User, supra, note 41 at 1012-24.
[Simall corporations unable to bear the risks of successor liability must plan to
avoid categorization within the [Ray] criteria. Acquisitions should be arranged so
that the public policy criteria established in [Ray] lack foundation in the circum-
stances of the small corporation's acquisition and continued production. In addi-
tion, the purchasing corporation should insulate itself as well as possible to ensure
minimum financial damage should products liability transfer.
Id. at 1016.
84. The court in Ray did not give its rule the "product line" name. Instead, the court in
Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440-41 (7th Cir. 1977), coined the term.
85. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at § 5.06[4].
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of consumer and business interests."
Use of the traditional rule of nonassumption in successor prod-
ucts liability cases is alive and well in most jurisdictions, including
Florida. Under these rules of corporate law, the parties to a corpo-
rate asset sale may prevent assumption of liability for product-re-
lated injuries by expressly rejecting assumption in the sale contract
and structuring the transaction to avoid the appearance of a de
facto merger or mere continuation. Consequently, determining suc-
cessor liability on the basis of the nonassumption rule will usually
deny a plaintiff redress for injury caused by a defective product
manufactured by the corporate predecessor. 87
Such a denial of recovery to injured plaintiffs is inconsistent
with Florida's adoption of strict products liability. 88 Because the
application of corporate law principles restricts the protection af-
forded by the strict products liability doctrine without a sound le-
gal rationale, new rules of successor liability must be established
which are appropriate to the products liability area. Any rule
adopted in Florida, however, must be one which accommodates
both business and consumer interests. The "products line" theory
set forth in Ray best accomplishes this result.
The adoption of a new rule for determining successor liability
should be left to the legislature, for as the court in Bernard noted,
"such broad public policy issues are best handled by legislatures
with their comprehensive machinery for public input and de-
bate."' 9 Some commentators have stated that adoption of any rule
expanding successor liability would require a corresponding modi-
fication of insurance law to make products liability insurance more
available to successor corporations. " Without these modifications,
86. Developments in the Rule, supra note 5, at 389; Products Liability for Successor
Corporations, supra note 19, at 373-74.
87. W. KImBLB & R. LEsHmx, supra note 2, at § 39.
88. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). The court in Bernard
stated that "[t]he fact that Florida has embraced the doctrine of strict liability in cases
involving injuries caused by defective products is irrelevant because that doctrine contem-
plates the defendant's active participation in placing the defective product into the stream
of commerce." 394 So. 2d at 555. This view espoused by the court in Bernard is sympto-
matic of the court's corporate focus and ignores the policies underlying the strict products
liability doctrine.
89. 394 So. 2d at 554 (quoting Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir.
1977)).
90. See note 41, supra. Recognizing that a uniform products liability law is necessary for
tort reform to have a sizable impact on insurance availability, the Commerce Department in
1979 drafted a uniform products liability law to encourage uniform laws at the state level.
DRAFT UNIFORM LIABILiTY LAW, 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979). For a discussion of the uniform
law, see, Protecting the Product User, supra, note 41, at 1026-30.
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rules expanding successor liability would be undermined.' In Ray,
liability was transferred to the successor on the assumption that
the corporation could insure itself against the risk of successor lia-
bility. If insurance is unavailable to the successor, the parties to an
acquisition will plan the sale to avoid assumption of products lia-
bility or will liquidate the seller to accomplish the same result.9"
Products liability plaintiffs would then remain unprotected. Only
the legislature is equipped to make the changes necessary to pre-
vent this consequence of the unavailability of liability insurance to
small corporations.' 8
If the Florida Legislature accepts the Bernard court's invitation
to consider the issue of successor products liability, and adopts the
"product line" theory developed by the California Supreme Court
in Ray, making the necessary changes in other laws, the State of
Florida will achieve the best accommodation of consumer and busi-
ness interests yet devised. Until that time, despite Florida's adop-
tion of the strict products liability doctrine, some injured consum-
ers will have no remedy where their injury occurs following an
asset sale for cash.
MICHAEL D. L. OLAFSON
In the 1979-1980 legislative session in California several bills aimed at reducing the num-
ber and costs of products liability suits were proposed. None were passed. See id. at 1026
n.100.
91. Id. at 1024.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1030-32.
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